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LETTER TO THE EDITORS
October 7, 1969
Board of Officers
University of Pennsylvania Law Review
3400 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, Pa. 19104
Dear Sirs:
In the March issue of Volume 117, University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, Mr. Justice Arthur Goldberg attempted to reply to some
of the attacks recently launched against the Supreme Court's decisions
involving the fifth amendment. To those of us who feel that the fifth
amendment should be preserved intact, the Article was a disappointing
rejoinder to the proposal submitted by Judge Henry Friendly in The
Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case For Constitutional Change,
37 U.

IN. L. REv. 671 (1968).

The Court's detractors accuse the justices of being overly solicitous
of a suspect's interests. Through most of the article, the best that
Justice Goldberg can do is repeat and enlarge upon his explication of
the privilege in Murphy v. Waterfront Commissioner, 378 U.S. 52
(1964). In that opinion he suggested that the constitutional immunity
from compelled self-incrimination reflects, inter alia, the American
people's "unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of perjury, self accusation or contempt .

.

.

."

Id. at 55.

But disinclination to cruelty was not the primary moving force in the
establishment of the fifth amendment. As Judge Friendly has pointed
out, this is no more cruel than requiring a mother to take the stand to
accuse her own son.
Justice Goldberg's article is not a defense of the right to remain
silent, but an apology for it. The privilege must be defended on the
attacker's battlefield and with his own weapons. To defend a citizen's
right to shun the snooperies of a McCarthy is to joust at windmills, for
today's challenge comes not from the House Un-American Activities
Committee, but from responsible men, many of whom are deeply concerned about crime in our society.
Inherent in our Constitutional framework is a presumption that
the accused is innocent until proven guilty. The suspect's right to stand
mute is the mechanism through which that presumption operates. If
forced to choose between self-accusation and perjury, many defendants
would proclaim their innocence and suborn perjury. Juries, well aware
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of the pressure upon the accused, would tend to disbelieve defense testimony to a greater degree than they do now. Thus, compelled testification would reduce ineluctably the fundamental presumption of innocence.
Firm adherence to the presumption of innocence requires that
jurors not be urged to draw inferences from the defendant's silence.
Where the prosecutor inveighs against the exercise of the privilege and
comments upon the defendant's refusal to testify, he emasculates the
presumption.
Records of all corporations including one-man corporations are not
subject to the fifth amendment privilege, while the corporate officer's
testimony is. Distinctions based upon the surrender of the fifth amendment privilege in exchange for the advantages of corporate form are
specious. Since business records cannot be as easily falsified as an
individual's testimony, a jury is not unduly skeptical of their reliability
as objective evidence. When forced to produce these records the holder
has no opportunity to perjure himself; thus no presumption of guilt
arises. The inconsistent treatment of corporations and natural persons
is otherwise unjustifiable.
Viewing the fifth amendment as a corollary to the presumption of
innocence obviates reliance upon the amendment where only an overly
loose construction will yield a desired result. A semantic demonstration
that a criminal defendant has in some way been "compelled to be a
witness against himself" may not be convincing. The argument is
purely formal; thus it may be stalemented by an adversary's refusal to
construe the words of the amendment quite so broadly.
Let us not, then, call the fifth amendment a concession to the
criminal in us all. The privilege does not reflect an attempt to give the
criminal a sporting chance in his battle with the oppressive forces of
law and order. It is, rather, the essence of American criminal justice.
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